Fault injection attacks have become a serious threat against cryptographic ICs. However, the traditional security evaluation often demands experienced engineers repeatedly scan the IC under test for a few hours to a few days, and take the workload statistics and experiences as qualitative indexes. This paper proposes a quantitative model to evaluate security based Design for Security Test (DFST), considering both the sensitive time during the algorithm operation and the sensitive area of the cryptographic IC against fault injection attacks. The case study on two RSA implementations demonstrates the feasibility of the quantitative evaluation of security model.
INTRODUCTION
Cryptographic integrated circuits (ICs) are dedicated semiconductor implementations of various cryptographic algorithm and have been employed in an increasing number of consumer products, e.g., smart cards, cell phones, and set-top boxes, to provide security and privacy protection. In order to ensure that the confidential information in cryptographic ICs will be generated, stored, transmitted and processed safely, we define security for its information assurance capabilities with the ability to resist attacks. Cryptographic modules as one of the information security products, how to timely and efficiently evaluate its security to complete their functions, has issued the relevant international standards and many scholars have made a research in this are a (Su et al., 2011) .
Cryptographic ICs inevitably become the targets of numerous attacks, including fault injection attacks. The fault injection may cause transient logic errors during the execution of cryptographic algorithms. The transient errors may bypass the security condition checks, or be used for differential fault analysis(DFA) (Barenghi et al., 2012) .There are multiple methods to invoke faults such as variations in supply voltage, variations in the external clock, temperature variation, white light, laser, and X-rays and ion beams (Kim and Quisquater, 2007) . The RSA implementation with Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT-RSA) was reported broken by fault attacks with only one faulty computation (Boneh et al., 2001) . Similarly the secret keys could be compromised from ECC, DES, AES and RC5 crypto modules etc. (BarEl et al., 2006) .
The key point of fault injection attack is injecting a fault in correct location and correct time. Therefore security evaluation must be done in both time and space domains. The security evaluation in space domain is to locate the vulnerable region of cryptographic ICs under test. The security evaluation in time domain is to identify the sensitive time period on the vulnerable region.
The traditional security evaluation often demands experienced engineers repeatedly scan the IC under test for a few hours to a few days to obtain effective results. Take the smart card test for example, it usually takes 1-5 days for security evaluation against laser beam attacks (MasterCard International Incorporated, 2005). On one hand, this is due to the niche probability of effective fault injection both on the temporal and the spatial domain. On the other hand, the traditional way of fault injection test cannot effectively detect the internal logic errors due to the limited IO numbers. The requirement on specific and profound knowledge of cryptographic ICs also makes it difficult for successful evaluation both in space and time domains. Besides, location of the vulnerable region is affected by the attack time, which will cause inaccurate evaluation results if security evaluation in space and time are separated.
Motivated by these challenges, we develop a quantitative model to evaluate the security considering both the sensitive time and space during the algorithm operation for cryptographic ICs, which is based on the proposed design for security test (DFST) in (Shao et al., 2014) against fault injection attacks with industrial automatic test equipment (ATE). A three dimensions (3D) fault map in time and space can be quickly and accurately obtained, which helps to locate the error-prone region of cryptographic ICs. The value representing the security level can be calculated by the quantitative model.
Compared to the existing security evaluation, the main contributions of the proposed security evaluation method are as follows:  Security evaluation is performed based DFST, which helps to diagnose the fault occurrence locations with high accuracy and fault occurrence time period with high efficiency.  The quantitative model considers both the space domain and the time domain, which could provide intuitive understanding and comprehensive evaluation of cryptographic ICs security against fault injection attacks. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We briefly introduce the background of fault injection attacks on cryptographic ICs and security test of cryptographic ICs with DFST in Section II. In Section III, we present the evaluation flow based on DFST method and present the quantitative model considering both the space and the operation time. In Section IV, a case study on two RSA implementations is demonstrated to validate the effectiveness of the quantitative evaluation model. The study is concluded in Section V.
BACKGROUND

Fault Injection Attacks
Fault injection attackers aim to maliciously alter the correct functioning of computing devices, and analyze the faulty output to retrieve the secret information, which been listed into Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS 140-3, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules (NIST, 2009), generally accepted as one of the standard security evaluation methods. Fault injection techniques can be classified in two main categories: hardware fault injection, and software fault injection (Ningfang et al., 2011) .The hardware fault injection are of the main interest in this paper, which include variations in the external clock, variations in supply voltages, laser illumination, X-rays and ion beams radiation etc.
The hardware fault injection tools can be classified by their (temporal and spatial) precision and the cost (Kim and Quisquater, 2007) .
With well-timed power spikes or dropdowns into the supply line, it is possible to for the device to skip specific instruction execution. The temporal precision depends on the voltage drop/spike duration and synchronization with the target device. Similarly, altering the length of a single clock cycle may corrupt data storage, which also requires relatively high temporal precision.
Electromagnetic (EM) disturbances near the device may induceddy currents in the circuit, causing temporary alterations of the signal voltage level.
Laser beam and heavy ion micro beam can cause abnormal behaviors on semiconductor devices through single event effects (SEE), where a strong radiation of a transistor may form a temporary conductive channel in the dielectric, which, in turn, may cause the logic circuit to switch state in a precise and controlled manner.
Fault Attacks to Break Cryptosystems
Fault injection has been reported effective on various crypto modules. DES (Data Encryption Standard) was reported vulnerable against fault injection attacks at the15 th round, an exclusive-OR (XOR) operation between the correct and faulty cipher text will yield the 15 th round-sub keys. An exhaustive search of the 64 possible values of the corresponding substitution will reveal the left 6-bitsubkey and thus the entire key (Bar-El et al., 2006) . A fault occurs on the 9 th round of AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) before Mix Column operation will also yield the round key (Moradi et al., 2006) .This paper will take the right-toleft RSA binary implementation with Montgomery modular multiplication as the example to illustrate the principle of fault injection attacks.
RSA is one of the first practicable public-key cryptosystems and is widely used for secure data transmission, named after Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman (Rivest et al., 1978) . In such a crypto system, the encryption key is public and differs from the decryption key which is private and kept secret. Two distinct and large odd prime numbers p and q are used to generate two key-pair values: the public key-pair (e,N), and the private key-pair (d,N) (Wang, 2006; Zhang, 2005) . The RSA algorithm can be described as follows:
The modulus N is the product of two large primes p and q.
Computes e through ( )( ) ( )
, 1 1 1 gcd e p q − − = , where gcd refers to the function of greatest common divisor (Hardy and Wright, 1979) .
The RSA encryption is performed using the public key e: 
Where m is the plaintext,0<m<N, and c is the ciphertext which can be decrypted using the secret key d:
An effective fault induced in one of the RSA private key bits in the binary RSA implementation will result in a faulty decryption result. With detailed fault analysis, one can extract the key bit 
Obviously, if
And if
This process is repeated until enough information is obtained about the secret key d. RSA using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT-RSA) is also vulnerable to fault attacks (Kim and Quisquater, 2007) . Let a and b be the precomputed values required by the CRT-RSA, there is:
And define:
mod ( 1) mod ( 1)
The RSA signature s is the sum as:
Where:
If there is a fault injected during the computation of ( )
A simple gcd (greatest common divisor) calculation will factor N:
This will compromise the RSA secret key, since we can easily obtain d with known two large primes p and q.
Security Test of Cryptographic ICs with DFST
Quantitative Evaluation of Security is based on the proposed design for security test (DFST). In this section we demonstrate design for security test (DFST) method and the consequent security test with ATE on cryptographic ICs proposed in (Shao et al., 2014) , combining DFT and fault injection techniques to facilitate a fast security test against fault injection with a low IC area overhead. Figure 1 demonstrates the relation of different phases of cryptographic ICs from design to test. The cryptographic ICs are designed with the proposed DFST. Security test of cryptographic ICs is performed by an engineer in a third authentication party. The designers of cryptographic ICs should provide the test patterns to the security authentication party. The security test only concerns a small fraction of the internal circuit states, on which an injected fault will result in an effective faulty encryption/decryption result. With careful differential fault analysis, the effective faulty result will largely reduce the search space of the secret key. The principle idea of DFST is to observe the internal states of those vulnerable cells.
The flowchart of DFST is as follows: Firstly, we identify the sensitive registers with SER analysis as previously described. Secondly, we mark the sensitive registers in Register Transfer Level (RTL) design netlist by prefixing sensitive registers. For example, in the cryptographic algorithm of the rightto-left RSA binary implementation with Montgomery modular multiplication, all the sensitive registers d [i] are beginning with 'e_or_d_reg_'. Thirdly, we only insert those marked registers into scan chains. Finally, the test patterns are generated with the commercial Automatic Test Pattern Generation (ATPG) tools. The test pattern will be used during the security test.
Once cryptographic ICs are designed for security test with the proposed DFST, the security test could be performed with the industrial ATE equipment. The test structure is illustrated in Figure 2 .
The procedures of the security test are as follows: 1) Set the device under test (DUT) in test mode; 2) Run the test repeatedly with fault injection scanning the DUT; 3) Compare the test result to the golden references. If the two results are inconsistent, mark the area being attacked as the sensitive area; 4) Scan the whole DUT and form a fault map. 
QUANTITATIVE SECURITY EVALUATION BASED ON DFST
Since the attacks are sensitive in both time and space domains. We develop the quantitative security evaluation model accordingly. We first locate the vulnerable region of the IC under test. Then we further identify the sensitive time period on the vulnerable region. Thus we can plot the threedimensional (3D) map indicating the vulnerability. Each fault is represented with a cuboid, the bottom area stands for the fault injection spot on the chip layout, and the height stands for the sensitive time period of the spot. The volume of all the cuboids is then calculated for quantitative evaluation.
Security Evaluation in Space Domain
The aim of security evaluation in space domain is to locate the vulnerable region of ICs under test. The cryptographic ICs designed by DFST can facilitate fast and automatic security test in space domain against fault injection. The flow of security test with the DFST is displayed in Figure3. The procedures of the security evaluation in space are as follows: 1) Set the security chip designed by DFST in test mode; 2) Make a scan test of the security chip under faultattack; 3) Judge the sensitive area by comparing the scan output to the expected value and compute number of fault occurrences n. If the two results are inconsistent, mark the area being attacked as the sensitive area. 4) Scan the whole chip layout and form a 2D fault map. The Security evaluation based DFST can determine the sensitive region exactly by the output vector and has nothing to do with the output analysis, which is much more efficient than security chip without scan chain. During the security test, the chip surface will be scanned with various fault injection tools, such as laser illumination and ion beam irradiation. The chip can be scanned with any size of fault injection attack (FIA) spot, which can target from a single transistor to hundreds of transistors, depending on the equipment used by the attackers as described in Section II. Figure 4 illustrates scanning in the security test, where each scan (S 11 , S 12 …, S mn ) is scan spot, which corresponds to scan step and scan precision of fault injection tool.
The equation for quantitative security in space domain QS S for the entire chip is as:
Where N denotes the total number of the fault injection evenly traversing the entire IC, which depends on the entire chip area, each injection spot size and scan step; n denotes the number of fault 
Security Evaluation in Time Domain
Since security evaluation in time domain aims to locate the vulnerable time regions of marked vulnerable locations during the cryptographic algorithm execution, the cryptographic IC should work in function mode. In order to flexible control fault injection, security evaluation in time domain is operated by the method of function simulation. The procedures are as follows: 1) Select a sensitive logic cell from marked vulnerable locations and inject faults at certain time intervals. Fault can be injected by the simulation tools. The time interval of fault injection is flexible. A short interval usually means finer operation but longer evaluation cycle. We recommend one clock cycle as the time interval for the simulation of each fault injection. 2) Analysis the encryption/decryption results and judge the sensitive time. If the result generates a valid error, mark the time interval as the sensitive time. 3) Traverse the entire encryption/decryption period under fault injection at certain time intervals. 4) Move to the next a sensitive point and repeat the above steps. 5) Traverse all sensitive logic cells from marked vulnerable locations of 2D fault map. Then plot the sensitive time period for corresponding sensitive logic cells and form 3D fault map. Each fault is represented with a cuboid. The volume V of the sensitive regions is calculated as:
Where n denotes the total number of the sensitive spots in space; i denotes the ith spot that exhibits a fault; s(i) denotes the area of the i th fault injection spot; t(i) denotes the time during of the fault on the i th spot.
Eq. (13) does not take into account of the parallel and the serial implementations of the same cryptographic algorithm. A parallel implementation usually occupies larger IC footprint than the serial implementation, but takes shorter time. To eliminate the effect from parallel and serial operation of the same function, Eq. (13) could be updated through normalization:
Where S denotes the entire IC area, T denotes the entire time for each cryptographic execution cycle. A bigger value of Q S indicates a lower security level.
CASE STUDY
Security Quantitative Evaluation Method Based RSA
In this section, we demonstrate the quantitative evaluation with the implementation of a 1024-bit RSA cryptosystem. The RSA module is the right-toleft binary algorithm with Montgomery modular multiplication. The design mainly includes an 8051 microprocessor, memory, a bus controller, a random number generator (RNG), the RSA encryption and the decryption module. 
Experimental Results
In our simulation, the scan registers are synthesized with Synopsys Design Compiler™, the scan chains are inserted with DFT Complier™, the test patterns are generated from the ATPG tool TetraMax™, and the circuit simulator is chosen to be VCS™. Other similar tools can also be used. We identify 2048 sensitive registers and insert 6 scan-chains, which accounts for an area overhead of 0.6%. For our RSA implementation and the necessary peripheral circuits of 740,000 logic gates, the area of cryptographic IC design of RSA is 36mm 2 , with the technology of0.18um GSMC. Laser illumination is selected as fault injection source, and a laser spot size is selected to be 10umx 10umlarge. Figure 5 demonstrates the 2D fault map of the RSA cryptographic IC design. The crosses indicate the faults (not one by one indication due to the image resolution limit). The sensitive registers contain two types: key_ed [i] and e_or_d [i] . The total number of laser illumination traversing the entire chip is 360000, among which the number to successfully inject faults is 4248. Then the quantitative security evaluation of our test chip in space domain for the entire chip is calculated as: the fault injection attacks. The result is quite contrary to previous observation that CRT-RSA is superior compared to the right-to-left binary implementation, in terms of better security against simple power analysis etc. This quantitative evaluation model can help the product designers to select the appropriate implementation, considering potential attack environments.
CONCLUSIONS
The security evaluation against fault injection attacks is challenging due to the niche probability of effective fault injection both on the temporal and spatial domain and the difficulty in observing internal transient logic errors. This paper proposes a quantitative model to evaluate security based DFST against fault injection attacks, considering both the operation time and the sensitive area of the cryptographic ICs. Simulation results on two RSA implementations demonstrate the feasibility of the design for security test method and the evaluation model, which can be easily extend to implementation of other cryptographic algorithms. Further work is to improve the efficiency of the security evaluation with automated scripts.
